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LUCIANO FLORID I 
MATHEMATICAL SKEPTICISM: 
A SKETCH WITH HISTORIAN IN FOREGROUND 
A skeptical look should be cast upon mathematical theories ... 
(Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh!) 
HISTORICAL AMNESIA 
We know very little about mathematical skepticism in modern times. 2 Imre Lakatos 
once remarked that "in discussing modern efforts to establish foundations for 
mathematical knowledge one tends to forget that these are but a chapter in the great 
effort to overcome skepticism by establishing foundations for knowledge in 
general. "3 And in a sense he was clearly right: modern thought-with its new 
discoveries in mathematical sciences, the mathematization of physics, the spreading 
of Pyrrhonist doctrines, the centrality of epistemological foundationalism and the 
diffusion of the geometrical method in philosophy- was the most natural arena in 
Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh, Descartes' Dream: The World according to Mathematics (London, 
1986),58. 
An issue of central importance in sixteenth-century philosophy of mathematics was whether 
mathematics could be correctly interpreted as a science from an Aristotelian perspective. Known as the 
"debate on the certainty of mathematics" (Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum), the problem has been 
amply studied, but it has to be stressed that it has got very little to do with skepticism. It develops before 
the pUblication of Sextus Empiricus' works and within a thoroughly Aristotelian framework; see the series 
of articles published by Giulio C. Giacobbe in Physis-Rivista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza: "II 
Commentarium de certitudine mathematicarum disciplinarum di Alessandro Piccolomini," 14 (1972), 162-
93; "Francesco Barozzi e la Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum, " 14 (1972), 357-74; "Epigoni nel 
seicento della Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum: Giuseppe Biancani," 18 (1976), 5-40; "A 
progressive Jesuit in the Renaissance Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum: Benito Pereyra," 19.1-4 
(1977), 51-86; William A. Wallace "The Certitude of Science in Late Medieval and Renaissance 
Thought," History of Philosophy Quarterly, 3 (1986),281-91; and Paolo Mancosu "Aristotelian Logic 
and Euclidean Mathematics: Seventeenth-Century Developments of the Quaestio de certitudine mathe-
maticarum," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 23 (1992), 241-65. 
Imre Lakatos, "Infinite Regress and Foundations of Mathematics," Lakatos, Philosophical Papers, 
ed. John Worrall and Gregory Currie, 2 vols. (Cambridge, UK, 1978),2:3-23, here 4. 
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which skepticism and mathematics could confront each other.4 The problem 
remains, however, that no investigation of the whole topic has yet been attempted. 
Thus, as far as we know, mathematical certainties should have clashed with skeptical 
doubts, but whether and to what extent there was indeed a historical debate on 
mathematical skepticism in modem thought remains to be ascertained. 
The wo~ way to cope with the conceptual amnesia highlighted by Lakatos 
would be to implant an utterly new memory in our system of knowledge. Luckily, 
there is no need to fabricate an ideal history of the Zeitgeist. We can be more 
moderately Platonist and work toward a recollection of our intellectual past by 
uncovering the archeolo,gical origins of our knowledge. There are few primary 
sources containing an explicit and extensive discussion of mathematical skepticism 
in modem times,S but one of them is the Histoire des mathematiques by Jean-
Etienne Montucla, the monumental work that marks the beginning of a truly 
scientific approach to the historiography of mathematics.6 It is a rich mine that I 
intend to exploit in this paper. 
Cf. Enrico de Angelis, n metoda geometrico nella filosofia del seicento (Pisa, 1964) for an interesting 
historical reconstruction of the use of geometrical methods in seventeenth- century philosophy. 
5 To my knowledge, none of the subsequent histories of mathematics has ever again dedicated so much 
space to mathematical skepticism, and this is not by chance, if my interpretation of the foundationalist 
role of mathematical skepticism is correct. Before Montuc1a, I know of only a few other texts which 
discuss Sextus' objections at some length, among which are Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's 
Examen ... vanitatis doctrinae gentium, et veritatis Christianae disciplinae (Mirandulae [MirandolaJ, 
1520), about which see below; the De Veritatibus geometricis /ibri II prior contra scepticos et Sextum 
Empiricum (Hafniae [CopenhagenJ, 1656) by Wilhelmus Langius (Villum Lange, 1624-1682); Pierre-
Daniel Huet, Demonstratio evangelica (Paris, 1679; Amsterdam, 1680; Paris, 1690; and Leipzig, 1703), 
about which see below; and a long section in Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, Examen du Pirrhonisme ancien 
et moderne (The Hague, 1733) dedicated to the relation between skeptical doubts and mathematical 
certainty. Of course, to these texts one must add Descartes' discussion of mathematical skepticism in the 
Meditations and the debate he engendered, Bayle's Dictionary, Hobbes' polemic against analytic geo-
metry and Hume's remarks on the nature of mathematics. I hope to study these sources in my future 
research. 
Edouard Doublet, "Montucla: l'historien des mathematiques," Bulletin de l'Observatoire de Lyon, 
5 (1913), 3-8: "L' Histoire des MatMmatiques de Montuc1a est un livre precieux pour tous ceux qui 
s'interessent a l'histoire des sciences. A leurs yeux, cet ouvrage n'a qu'un tort: - il est fort difficile de 
se Ie procurer. . .. D'autres Histoires des Mathematiques ont pam au dix-neuvieme siec1e. Leurs auteurs 
ont assurement trouve de grands secours dans Ie travail de Jean-Etienne Montuc1a." On Montuc1a see 
Auguste-Savinienle Blond, Notice historique sur la vie et les ouvrages de lean-Etienne Montucla (Paris, 
1800), rpt. in Jean-Etienne Montucla, Histoire des matMmatiques, ed. Charles Naux (paris, 1968), 
4:662-72: "Sur la vie et les ouvrages de ¥ontucla, Extrait de la Notice historique lue par Auguste-
Savinienle Blond a la Societe de Versailles,le 15 janvier 1800, avec des additions par Jerfime de Lande;" 
George Sarton, "Montucla (1725-1799): His Life and Works," Osiris, 1 (1936),519-67; Kurt Vogel, 
"L'historiographie mathematique avant Montucla," Actes du XIe Congres International d'Histoire des 
Sciences (1965), vol. 2 (Wroclaw, 1968), 179-84; Dirk I. Struik, "The historiography of mathematics 
from Proklos to Cantor," Schriftenreihe fUr Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften, Technik und Medizin, 
17 (1980), 1-22; and Noel M. Swerdlow, "Montucla's Legacy: The History of the Exact Sciences," 
lournal of the History of Ideas, 54 (1993), 299-328. 
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THE HISTORIAN'S PERSPECTIVE 
When Montucla died, in 1799, he had already published the first two volumes of the 
new edition of his Histoire des mathematiques. 7 Montucla had dedicated ample 
space to the discussion of mathematical skepticism in the first and much shorter 
edition, which had appeared in 1758. The second edition differed from the first in 
several ways: there were a number of new details that enriched the original 
version;8 many remarks previously placed in the footnotes were now inserted in the 
main text; and there was a new section, number 9, which illustrated the roots of our 
conception of mathematical certainty. The part on mathematical skepticism, 
however, remained unmodified. After discussing the nature and internal organiza-
tion of mathematics in general, Montucla shows in section 6 of the first volume how 
all great philosophers have always admired mathematics. He then introduces the 
skeptical attack, which becomes the central subject of section 7, which is dedicated 
to Sextus Empiricus and Epicurus, while section 8 discusses the importance of 
mathematics with respect to the other sciences. 
Montucla approaches the topic of mathematical skepticism in several stages 
which, for the sake of simplicity, may be organized into a broad premise, five 
restricting steps and two further assumptions with a clearly anti-skeptical purport. 
Premise) The premise concerns the nature of mathematics itself. Geometry and 
arithmetic, the most fundamental branches of mathematics dealing with the physical 
continuum and the discrete manifold, are abstract, true, intuitive and certain. They 
have what Montucla calls an origin meta physique: their elements are the result of 
a process of intellectual abstraction from everyday experience. Because of its 
abstract nature, mathematics provides effective knowledge about reality, while 
possessing at the same time a self-evident basis. Its statements are true descriptions 
of states of the world, and its basic notions are obvious and epistemologically 
intuitive. Finally, because of its deductive structure, mathematics is a body of 
knowledge which enjoys the highest degree of logical certainty. 
i) In the past, there have been several types of detractors of mathematics. However, 
the only ones deserving a theoretical discussion are the Pyrrhonists, who attempted 
to undermine mathematical knowledge by means of epistemological arguments. 
ii) Not every skeptical argument is of interest. In general, Pyrrhonism is a 
ridiculous philosophy. Skeptics can employ their subtle sophisms and paradoxes 
Jean-Etienne MontucJa, Histoire des mathematiques, 2 vols. (Paris, 1758). Of the second new 
edition, revised and augmented in four volumes, only the first two were edited by Montucla (1799). 
After his death, the remaining two volumes were completed by Jerome Lalande (1802). The entire set 
was reprinted with a preface by Charles Naux (Paris, 1968). 
8 Ibid., 2nd ed. (Paris, 1799-1802), 1 :20-24, concerning mixed mathematics and the theory of the point 
are identical to the original version's 1:23-28, whereas the following discussion of Epicurean philosophy 
is enlarged. On 1 :29 of the new edition we find anew, long paragraph on Pico della Mirandola, which 
replaces a shorter note in the first edition. According to Montucla, Ie celebre Pic della Mirandole 
believed that theology and mathematics were incompatible. MontucJa agrees with the view but concludes 
that tant pis pour la theologie. On 1:33 of the new edition we find a new section on mathematical 
certainty which is fundamentally Cartesian in its nature. 
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only to engender confusion among the simple-minded, but the real outcome of their 
attacks is a confutation of themselves.9 
iii) Only some skeptical arguments deserve to be discussed, namely those put 
forward against geometry by Sextus Empiricus in Contra Geometras. Note that no 
reference is made to Sextus Empiricus' anti-arithmetical attack contained in Contra 
Arithmeticos. 
iv) Not all anti-geometrical arguments are of equal importance, though. Only the 
epistemological arguments against the nature of elementary geometrical objects, that 
is point, line, and surface, are worth a reply, for the latter can help the mathemati-
cian to cast further light on the solid foundation of the discipline. No reference is 
made to the first half of Sextus Empiricus' attack, which in Contra Geometras 
attempts to undermine the value of the process of postulating premises from which 
necessary conclusions can then be inferred.lO 
v) Sextus' arguments against the possibility of geometrical objects are all alike, so 
in order to have a clear grasp of their nature and shortcomings it is sufficient to 
analyze and refute just a sample of them. 
Having finally reached the point he wishes to discuss, Montucla makes explicit 
his two anti-skeptical premises: 
a) Geometrical objects are of such an abstract nature that they are bound to raise 
questions and uncertainties in those who do not understand them properly. This 
assumption obviously cuts the ground from under the skeptical challenge: casting 
doubt on the nature of geometrical entities becomes now tantamount to showing how 
little one has understood them. 
b) Before discussing mathematical skepticism, Montucla invites the reader to endorse 
what he calls "a necessary rule in the search for truth:" even if the skeptical 
difficulties concerning the initial principles were insuperable, they should not affect 
our trust in the validity of the mathematical consequences established on the basis 
of such principles and reasoning, whose evidence cannot be questioned. An obvious 
anti-foundationalist claim which purports to safeguard Montucla's pragmatic 
approach to the utility and effectiveness of mathematics. 
Ibid., 2nd ed., 1 :21: "11 suffIroit presque, pour repondre a ses objections, de remarquer Ie ridicule 
d'un pyrrhonisme qui va jusques a pretendre qu'il n'y a aucune demonstration, aucun moyen de se 
procurer la moindre certitude, pour qui les axiomes du sens commun sont de moindre poids que Ie 
temoignage des sens si souvent exposes a l'erreur; qui pretend enfin detruire et aneantir la science du 
raisonnement. " 
to The point is developed by Pierre-Daniel Huet in his Demonstratio e\langelica. This is an impressive 
work of systematic erudition, in which Huet attempts to prove the principles of Christian religion by 
means of an axiomatic apparatus. The Prae/atio, section III, and Axiomata IV, sections 11 and III, 
contain interesting if occasional remarks on a skeptical philosophy of mathematics. Euclidean geometry, 
as the fundamental branch of mathematics, is based on defmitions and axioms that are widely accepted, 
but cannot be demonstrated. According to Huet, the probatory force of geometrical demonstrations 
depends, therefore, on conventions and universal consensus, and the certainty of our conclusions cannot 
be absolute, but remains constantly, if only hypothetically, open to falsification. 
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THE HISTORIAN'S BACKGROUND 
Montucla's position, just sketched, is based upon a number of interesting presupposi-
tions, which can be grouped under three main headings. 
1. The mathematization of physics. 
Montucla writes in a century when mathematics enjoyed one of the less troublesome 
of all its great periods of developmentY The new techniques of the infinitesimal 
calculus led to the development of several major branches of mathematics, which 
turned out to be particularly suited for the description of natural phenomena. 
Analysis made possible a full mathematization of physics, and it is not by chance 
that serious historiographical work on mathematics appeared only in the middle of 
the eighteenth century, after many mathematicians had started to believe that all the 
major discoveries in the field had been made. The great scientific fertility shown 
by mathematical physics provided a practical justification for a number of 
mathematical procedures and results which, although still found wanting in logical 
rigor and a clear conceptual foundation, de facto vindicated the epistemological 
practice of the mathematicians of the time who, in their tum, were inclined to value 
practical results more than mathematical means. Mathematical knowledge was 
simply supposed to provide true information about nature, while the mathematization 
of physics was thought to be possible and productive because reality in itself was 
supposed to be intrinsically mathematical. As a result, the eighteenth century saw 
the triumph of mechanics and the Galilean vision of nature as a book written in 
mathematical language, despite the gradual disappearance of the Cartesian-
Newtonian God, the source of ontological stability and epistemological correspon-
dence between certainty and truth. In The Analyst (1734), Berkeley had already 
exposed the logically unsatisfactory status of the calculus, despite its practical 
accomplishments. But the lack of an adequate conceptualization and systematization 
of the new mathematical field was not felt to be a genuine problem. Mathematical 
theorems and their applications did not float in the empty space of free axiomatic 
constructions, as it were, but were thought to repose directly on the essential nature 
of reality which, given their success, obviously granted them full justification. 
Coherence and consistency of mathematical knowledge were semantic concepts: they 
depended on, and were thought to follow from the coherence and consistency of the 
model provided by Nature. We must wait until the following century and the work 
of Bolzano, Cauchy, Abel, Dirichlet and Weierstrass, among others, for the 
development of a satisfactory, fully rigorous analysis that removed from geometrical 
concepts all appeals to spatial intuition, by means of an interpretation based upon 
number theory. In Montucla's time, foundationalist problems were not yet crucial. 
11 See Morris Kline, Mathe11UJticalThoughtjromAncient to Modem Times (New York, 1972 and rpt.) 
for a very instructive overview of the history of mathematics in the period. I largely agree with most of 
what Kline says in the two more philosophical chapters entitled "Mathematics as of 1700" and 
"Mathematics as of 1800," but for reasons I shall clarify in the conclusion I cannot share his later 
criticism of the axiomatic movement and the foundationalist programs. 
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They became central only in the nineteenth century, when the discovery of non-
Euclidean geometries and the paradoxes of set theory generated a radical dissatisfac-
tion with the realist and intuitive interpretation of mathematics, and caused geometry 
to lose its centrality. 
The mathematization of physics, with its applied fields and problem-solving 
mentality, pervades Montucla's work and provides a favorable context that probably 
engendered in him a certain optimism about the possibility of providing a fmal 
refutation of skeptical problems. It also goes some way toward explaining why he 
suggested the assumption of the "necessary rule in the search for truth," with its 
clearly anti-foundationalist character. 
2. The supremacy of geometry 
For centuries, Euclidean geometry represented the best model of logical and 
systematic thought and hence of mathematical certainty. The Greeks left a rigorous 
and systematic body of geometrical theorems, but only a heuristic, empirical practice 
of arithmetical computation. It is tempting to see the prevalence of geometrical 
methods in Euclid as the result of the first foundationalist crisis brought about by the 
discovery of the incommensurables and the consequent breakdown of Pythagoreism. 
But whether one endorses such an interpretation or objects to it, the point remains 
that geometrical methods, both in algebra and in number theory, represented for 
centuries the only widespread approach to mathematics.!2 Only in the seventeenth 
century were the conditions established for a fundamental process of algebraization 
of the theory of space, thanks to the introduction of algebraic methods in geometry 
by Viete, Fermat and Descartes!3 and then the development of the infinitesimal 
calculus by Newton and Leibniz. It was the beginning of a process that led to the 
foundation of mathematical knowledge based on arithmetic and then on set theory 
and mathematical logic, and in the end deprived geometry of its role as the Queen 
of all mathematical sciences. But it was a slow process. In number theory the 
acceptance of negative and imaginary numbers, two essential steps toward the de-
physicalization of mathematics, was not immediate, even in Descartes. Leibniz 
thought that metaphysics was related to all other sciences, including geometry, as 
the latter was to all the other mathematical disciplines. And although Euler had 
rejected geometry as the basis for the calculus and tried to work only with functions, 
that is by means of algebraic formulae, Montucla still believed that the greatness of 
analytic geometry consisted in its geometrical method, not in its translation of curves 
into algebraic equations. As for the calculus itself, he could still refer to Newton 
as the greatest geometrician of Europe. No wonder he perceived Contra Geometras 
12 For a critical analysis of the evolution of Euclid's Elements see Wilbur Richard Knorr, The Evolution 
of the Euclidean Elements: A Study of the Theory of Incommensurable Magnitudes and Its Significance 
for Early Greek Geometry (Dordrecht, 1975), 306-13, who argues convincingly against the "foundation-
alist crisis" hypothesis. 
13 See Michael S. Mahoney, "The Beginning of Algebraic Thought in the Seventeenth Century," 
Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics, and Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex, 1980), 141-55, for 
a very clear presentation of the issue. 
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so close to his interests. One must wait until the first half of the nineteenth century 
to find Gauss describing arithmetic as the most fundamental of all mathematical 
disciplines. Whitehead and Russell did not even trouble to publish the fourth and 
last volume of Principia Mathematica, which was planned to provide the logical 
foundation of geometry, but in the eighteenth century mathematicians still referred 
to themselves as "geometers." In a way, Plato had been vindicated (geometrization 
of the world) but not yet Pythagoras (arithmetization of geometry): rigorous 
mathematics meant geometry, so the philosophy of mathematics meant the 
philosophy of geometry. The definitive replacement of the synthetic approach to the 
description of geometrical figures as intuitively representable (visual thinking) by a 
logical and purely analytic approach, made possible by algebraic thought-handling 
relations, rather than properties, via an operative symbolism that is ontologically 
free, was still to come. 
3. Mathematical skepticism 
Implicit in what Montucla has to say on the utility of skepticism in mathematics are 
three ways of interpreting Sextus' anti-mathematical arguments. 
a) There is a philological approach, interested in linguistic matters or in what Sextus 
says on other authors, Euclid included. In different ways, this is the case in 
VoSSiUS,14 Bochner,15 or, more interestingly, scholars such as Heiberg or Heath. 
b) There is an anti-intellectualist approach, adopted for example by Gianfrancesco 
Pico della Mirandola. Mathematics is attacked on the basis of Sextus' arguments, 
with the intention of undermining the dogmatist's excessive faith in human 
knowledge. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the main polemic target 
was usually Aristotelianism. 16 
c) Finally, there is a foundationalist interpretation, which employs skepticism in 
order to investigate the solidity and reliability of mathematical knowledge. This is 
the approach taken by Montucla, who explicitly connects it to Descartes. 
The difference between the anti-intellectualist and the foundationalist interpreta-
tion is easily clarified once we realize that there are a number of problems Sextus 
14 Gerardii Ioannis Vossii, De Universae Mathesios natura & constitutione tiber cuis subjungitur 
chronologia mathematicorum (Amsterdam, 1650). On p. 1, introducing the topic of the scientiae 
mathematicae, their nature and number, Vossius writes: "Sic voce matematon utitur Sextus Pyrrhonius, 
cum libros x inscribit adversus Mathematicos. Nec enim disputat adversus Arithmeticen, & Geometriam; 
quam Grammaticem, Historiam, Poeticen, Rhetoricen, Astrologiam judiciarim, Musicen, Logicen, 
Physicen, Ethicen." He then refers to Sextus a few more times in order to explain some linguistic 
matters, but never actually discusses his skeptical arguments, even when he deals critically with Epicurus 
and Ramus. 
15 See Salomon Bochner, The Role of Mathematics in the Rise of Science (Princeton, 1966), 363: " ... 
[Sextus Empiricus'] works are boring, but important. For instance, the proemium in the poem of 
Parmenides comes from Sextus." 
16 Socrates, for example, objected to the utility of the study of mathematics on ethical grounds, and 
philosophers such as Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola employed skeptical arguments for anti-
intellectualist and theological purposes, see his Examen ... vanitatis doctrinae gentium, et veritatis 
Christianae disciplinae,lib. I, cap. 7, 750-51, which contain a brief summary of the Sextian issues with 
definitions of point, line, and plane, and lib. III, cap. 5-6 against geometry, and cap. 7 against arithmetic. 
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never mentions in Contra Geometras. Although it would have been in keeping with 
the skeptical strategy of accumulating any sort of arguments in order to undermine 
the dogmatic position, Sextus never rejects what is stated by the postulates or the 
common notions-possibly because, whoever is the source of Contra Geometras, he 
did not mean to be cut off from discussion with other geometricians-; he does not 
question either the fifth postulate or the use of superposition and disregards each of 
the three classic problems of Greek geometry, which were so well known in his 
time: the duplication of the cube (how to construct the edge of a cube having twice 
the volume of a given cube), the trisection of an angle (how to divide a given 
arbitrary angle into three equal angles), and the famous quadrature of the circle 
(how to construct a square having an area equal to that of a given circle). We know 
nowadays that none of these problems can be solved; except by approximation, with 
an unmarked straight edge and compasses, that is by means of algebraic methods. 
But the three problems were still discussed as open questions in the seventeenth 
century. Now, a foundationalist attack against the roots of geometry, an epistemolo-
gical challenge, had no great interest in investigating such issues. Considered 
simply as difficulties that had yet to be solved because they were particularly 
complex, their destiny would depend on the status of geometry as a science of space, 
not vice versa. However, a general denunciation of the intellectual ambitions of 
mathematicians could obviously take advantage of such clear cases of failure by 
presenting them as a reminder of the limits of human knowledge. In line with this 
interpretation, we observe Agrippa,l7 Sanchez, and Guy de Brues all making use 
of the geometrician's incapacity to square the circle to stress the limits of 
mathematical knowledge. When Sextus (or his source) criticized geometry he had 
a more scientific aim in mind. 
THE SKEPTIC PORTRAYED BY THE HISTORIAN 
We can now tum to Montucla's discussion of the anti-geometrical arguments. His 
sample consists of three skeptical paradoxes: 
1) Let us assume a circle with circumference C, center 0 and radius r, and let us 
draw a radius rn from 0 to every point Pn belonging to C. The sum of the sequence 
11 Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of Artes and Sciences 
(1531), ed. and tr. Catherine M. Dunn (Northridge, Calif., 1974). On p.58 (ch. 11: "Of Mathematical 
sciences in general"), Agrippa writes that the mathematical sciences, thought to be the most certain, 
consist only of the opinions of teachers to whom great credit is given. Their objects, like a perfect sphere 
or a circle, do not and cannot exist. And even if mathematical theories have never been the cause of 
heresies, Augustine wrote that they do not further salvation but lead men into error and separate them 
from God, while Jerome says that they are not "sciences of Godlinesse." A note by the editor suggests 
Augustine's De actis cum Felice Manichaeo, 1.10, or Confessions, V.3 as possible sources. But onp.75 
(ch. 22: "Of Geometry"), we read that Geometry is the Princess and mother of all learnings, as Philo 
Judaes has called it (the source is possibly De Agricultura, 13): Geometricians agree on everything and 
discuss only points, lines, and other things. However, no geometrician has ever been able to discover 
how to square the circle, in spite of Archimedes' claims to the contrary. 
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00 
of all the radii r l + r2 + ... , that is L r i covers the entire surface of the circle. 
i~1 
Let us consider now all the concentric circles (CC), including the innermost and 
the outermost: they will be crossed (K) by the same number of radii (R(x), that is 
"Ix Vy «R(x) A CC(y,C) -+ K(x,y». 
But then all circles will be equal to each other, for they will all contain the same 
number of points, that is 
"Ix Vy Vz «(R(x) A CC(y,C) A CC(z,C) -+ (K(x,y) A K(x,z») -+ (y = z» 
and this, according to Sextus, is an obvious reductio ad absurdum (see Fig. 1 at the 
end of this paper). 
2) A perfect sphere touches a perfect plane at one geometrical point, which is 
unextended by definition. By rolling forward, the sphere draws a perfect line, which 
is made of a series of geometrical points. The absurd result is that now a set of 
unextended points gives rise to an extended line (see Fig. 2). ) 
3) Let us assume a circle with circumference C, center 0 and radius r. Through 
every point Po of r let us draw a circle 'Yo concentric with respect to C, that is 
Vp «p E r) -+ 3'Y(Kh, p) A CC('Y, C). 
00 
The sum of the sequence of all concentric circles 'YI + 'Y2 + ... , that is L 'Yi 
i=1 
covers the entire surface of the circle, but this is absurd, since each circle 'Yo is only 
a line, which is supposed to have length but not breadth (see Fig. 3). 
Although the first paradox follows an obvious Sextian pattern, I have not been 
able to trace it to its original source, whereas the other two belong to the set of 
objections constructed in Contra Geometras (Contra Mathematicos, III, 27 and 66ff.) 
in order to show that, even if the geometricians are allowed to use their hypothetico-
deductive methods-and this has been already questioned by Sextus in the first half 
of the book-they cannot rely on their starting points, since none of the three 
elementary objects, i.e., the point, the line, and the surface, are free from 
contradictions . 
THE GEOMETRICIAN PORTRAYED BY THE SKEPTIC 
The skeptical objections are based on a thoroughly empiricist view. Sextus treats 
geometrical entities as if they should maintain some resemblance to material objects 
in order to be meaningful at all. He adopts this line of reasoning on the basis of an 
empiricist epistemology according to which: 
i) the logical possibility of an object is equivalent to the possibility of conceiving it; 
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ii) no conceivable object can be a purely mental object;18 therefore 
iii) a conceivable object cannot be completely void of empirical content but must 
preserve some mimetic feature. 
The empiricist tone of Sextus' criticism suggests that the epistemological turn, i.e., 
a clear focus on what the mind can know about the mathematical realm, has already 
occurred. It is a criticism justified by the fairly concrete approach adopted by 
Euclid himself in his Elements. 
I remarked above that, for more than two millennia, the Elements have been the 
most popular and influential paradigm of a deductive body of knowledge, very often 
the only one with which most educated people were acquainted. Like the Bible, it 
is one of those texts that have shaped Western culture. In it, we encounter the 
classic metaphor of the building as a model for the structure of knowledge, a 
metaphor that, together with the image of the tree of knowledge, will become 
common currency within any foundationalist project. The unique style of the work, 
which contributed so significantly to its popUlarity throughout the centuries, is the 
result of an admirable balance between empirical intuition and logical postulates, 
visual imagination and purely rational deductions. The overall structure of the 
thirteen books bears witness to a remarkable effort made toward the systematic 
construction of an abstract, universal, and logically rigorous body of mathematical 
knowledge, in which 465 theorems are logically inferred from a limited number of 
first principles explicitly stated at the outset.19 And yet, a fundamental empiricism 
still pervades the entire work. For example, the criterion of existence, provided by 
the notion of geometrical constructability, is justified by an empiricist approach 
which became too limited in the nineteenth century. And one needs to mention only 
the first proposition of Book One, which requires an equilateral triangle to be 
constructed on a given finite straight line, to recall that the very notion of 
demonstration often relies on the visualization of the theorem in question (MKPVI.U 
18 On Greek philosophy of mathematics and the skeptical attack see Ian Mueller, "Geometry and 
Skepticism," Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Jheory and Practice, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
et al. (Cambridge, UK, 1982),69-95. In Coping with Mathematics (The Greek Way) ([Chicago], 1980), 
Mueller comments upon M m, 37 writing that "the force of this sceptical argument derives from the 
representation of mental apprehension as imagining or picturing and the imposition of severe limits on 
imagination" (13). The point is that nothing can be apprehended unless it can somehow be imagined. 
See also p.17: "For Proclus the mathematical imagination is quite like what later philosophers called 
intuition. Its images are produced by reason itself as a necessary condition of its mathematical 
knowledge: the images are a "projection" (probote) of concepts and principles contained in reason but 
not fully grasped by it. " 
19 Euclid's geometry can be presented as a formal organization, not axiomatic and not thoroughly 
syllogistic, of material previously accumulated; cf. Ian Mueller "Greek Mathematics and Greek Logic," 
Ancient Logic and Its Modem Interpretations, ed. John Corcoran (Dordrecht, 1974), 35-70. "Euclid 
shows no awareness of syllogistic or even of the basic idea of logic, that validity of argument depends 
on its form" (37). " ... In his systematic presentation of the categorical syllogism in the first twenty-two 
chapters of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle never invokes mathematics" (48). " ... Stoic propositional logic, 
investigated most thoroughly by Chrysippus in the third century, shows no real connection with 
mathematical proof" (66). For a full analysis of Euclid's mathematical methods and a comparison with 
Hilbert's axiomatic approach see Ian Mueller, Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in 
Euclid's Elements (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). 
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means in Greek "to bring to light," hence "to show," and also "to prove"). 
As the limited use of the fourth ("Things which coincide with one another are 
equal to one another") and fifth ("The whole is greater than the part") postulate 
shows, Euclid was at least partially aware of, and perhaps not entirely happy with 
such "realistic" features of his geometry.20 If he could still regard them as 
unproblematic it was because of a more fundamental assumption underlying the 
Elements. Classic geometry was thought to be the result of the correct idealization 
of the properties of physical space and the corresponding behavior of extended 
bodies in that space. And since "Euclidean" geometry was the abstract grammar of 
physical space, until the nineteenth century space was understood as intrinsically 
Euclidean, that is, as Poincare clearly put it, three-dimensional, (at least potentially) 
infinite, continuous (no gaps), homogeneous (no privileged points), isotropic (no 
privileged directions through any point, i.e., equal in every direction), and such that 
any discrete object in it would satisfy the theorems of Euclidean geometry.21 
Given such a strict relation between space and geometry, theorems were supposed 
to be true descriptions of actual features of physical space (physicalization of 
geometry). The truth of geometrical statements (alethization of geometry) eclipsed 
the need for a tight verification of the consistency of the system and hence of the 
independence of its set of axioms. Sound proofs (valid inferences from true 
premises) rather than logically correct deductions (valid inferences in which it is 
never the case that the premise is affirmed and the conclusion is negated) 
represented the backbone of Euclidean geometry. On the basis of such a moderate 
alethization and physicalization of geometry, it is obvious that empirical factors 
could not only be tolerated as useful aids to the understanding, but also appreciated 
as the semantic links whereby the geometrical system was tied to the natural world 
of empirical intuition. The interpretation of Euclidean geometry as the idealized 
model of physical space was explicitly conveyed by the characterization of the most 
elementary geometrical objects in terms of abstract (in the strong sense of 
abstracted) entities: insofar as points, lines, and surfaces have unique properties they 
are no longer physical objects, but insofar as they are the result of an evident 
process of refinement and generalization from particular objects of intuition they are 
not "mere" logical constructs either, which mayor may not be amenable to physical 
(let alone visual) interpretation. Such abstract objects seem to enjoy a peculiar 
ontological status. They are not like other physical objects, but they are linked to 
perception and the real world via the criterion of conceiVability in imagination, 
which is precisely the criterion exploited by Sextus Empiricus in the construction of 
20 The fourth axiom, another clear case of empirical influence in the Elements, states that "things which 
coincide with one another are equal to one another," and this implies superposition, which in tum is 
necessary to prove congruence of figures. It is significant that Euclid tries to avoid its use whenever 
possible. Likewise, the fact that all Euclidean geometry is based on the avoidance of geometrical objects 
with actually infinite dimensions may not necessarily be due to the fact that the Elements present a 
geometry of touch or are even a tactile-muscular study of metric space; cf. William M. Ivins, Ir., Art 
& Geometry: A Study in Space Intuitions (Cambridge, Mass., 1946). 
21 Cf. Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, tr. William I. Greenstreet (1905; rpt. New York, 1952). 
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his paradoxes. In Book One, Euclid provides five geometrical postulates and five 
more general "common notions" without any further justification. They are left 
unproved on the basis of their self-evidence. Before this, Euclid lists twenty-three 
definitions which are supposed to clarify in more intuitive terms his technical 
vocabulary. The logical utility of such definitions is dubious, since they use other 
undefined terms, yet Euclid seems to believe they could serve to interpret the 
geometrical objects as referring to physical entities. They are not organized into 
primitive and derivate terms, but there is a tendency to accept this implicit 
distinction, and Sextus Empiricus attacks precisely those three terms that appear to 
be the most primitive in Euclid, namely (1st) "A point is that which has no part," 
(2nd) "A line is length without breadth" and (5th) "A surface is that which has 
length and breadth only. " 
The aim of the skeptical challenge is sufficiently straightforward: to show that 
geometrical and arithmetical statements cannot be claimed to provide actual 
knowledge about the world. In order to achieve such an end, Sextus relies on the 
usual weapon of logical possibility: against the empirical truth of geometrical 
statements he sets consistent counterfactuals leading to contradictions. In this way, 
he can highlight the physical content still pervading Euclidean geometry. Because 
of such empiricist criticism, two radically different interpretations of the skeptical 
strategy become possible, one slightly superficial and the other somewhat incorrect. 
The skeptic may be supposed simply to have failed to grasp the abstract nature 
of geometrical objects, and hence to have misunderstood Euclidean geometry. 
Sextus is incapable of seeing that the geometrical objects discussed by Euclid are not 
physical points and physical lines, so no further attention should be wasted on 
Pyrrhonian arguments. A champion of this position was Sir Henry Savile. Savile 
owned a manuscript, now in the Bodleian Library, containing a late sixteenth or 
early seventeenth-century copy of Contra Mathematicos.22 The text is in perfect 
condition apart from the book of Contra Geometras, which is underlined throughout 
and seems to have been studied by Savile. Savile does not appreciate Sextus' 
criticism. He mentions him only very briefly in one of his manuscripts,23 and in 
his Lectures on Euclid, after having discussed the nature of geometrical definitions 
and axioms, he dedicates a few paragraphs to Epicureans and Pyrrhonists, but only 
to dismiss them because "their arguments against the principles of Geometry are 
thoroughly insignificant and indeed completely sophistic. ,,24 This does not mean 
22 Ms Savilianus Gr. I. f. IOv: "Extant Sexti Empirici \ibri decem pros mathematikos, adversus 
mathematicos, hoc est universam dogmaticorum nationem. Nec enim illis in libris tam Geometriae et 
Arithmeticae, quam Grammaticae Poeticae, Historiae, Rhetoricae, Astrologiae divinatricis, Musicae, 
Logicae, Physicae et Ethicae fundamenta conbellantus" [conbello means literally "uproot"]. 
23 Cf. Ms. Savile 37, f. II, where Savile gives a reference to Sextus Empiricus' work without any 
further remark. 
24 Henry Savile, Praelectiones (Oxford, 1621). 157: " ... contra quae [i.e., Geometriae], totamque, adeo 
Geometriam acriter insurgunt duae philosophorum sectae, Pyrrhoniorum dico (qui sceptici & ephectici) 
& Epicureorum. Ac Ephecticorum quidem, qui quasi hostium more ex philosophiae agris fertilis 
cumprimis & foecundae frumenta populantes, & tanquam solem e mundo, sic ex animis nostris omnes 
scientiae non ramos modo, sed radicum fibras evellentes, totam evertunt philosophiam: horum, inquam, 
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that Savile himself failed to recognize that geometry faced the major problem 
represented by the lack of full evidence, for example in the case of the fifth 
postulate.25 But it is interesting to notice that, when Riemann in his famous lecture 
"On the Hypothesis on Which Geometry Ultimately Lies" introduced his version of 
non-Euclidean geometry, he started by explaining the problems arising from the 
definitions of point and line in Euclid, the very issue Savile had been unable to grasp 
when reading Sextus. 
We come in this way to the second perspective from which mathematical 
skepticism can be interpreted. The glass of Euclidean geometry is only half empty 
of empirical presuppositions, as it were. Thus the skeptical challenge can also be 
seen as a radical attempt to eliminate all the intuitive and physical residues in the 
geometrical system, that is as a reductio ad absurdum of the empirical elements still 
present in classic geometry. This was Leibniz' position. In a letter to Varignon, 
he wrote that: 
I even fmd that it means much in establishing sound foundations for a science 
that it should have such critics. It is thus that the skeptics, with as much reason, 
fought the principles of geometry; that father Gotignies, a Jesuit scholar, tried 
to throw out the best foundations of algebra; and that Mr. Cluver and Mr. 
Nieuwentijt have recently attacked our infinitesimal calculus, though on different 
grounds. Geometry and algebra have survived, and I hope that our science of 
infinites will survive too .... I have often thought that a reply by a geometrician 
to the objections of Sextus Empiricus and to the things which Francis Sanchez 
... sent to Clavius, or to similar critic's, would be something more useful than 
we can imagine. This is why we have no reason to regret the pains which are 
necessary to justify our analysis for all kinds of minds capable of understanding 
it.26 
Leibniz appreciated the anti-empirical impact of Sextus' arguments. He certainly 
knew very well that "all the difficulties raised by the Pyrrhonians concern only the 
empirical truths" (veritez sensibles), 27 and correctly understood that the skeptical 
challenge had a foundationalist nature. 
argumenta contra principia Geometriae perquam levia sane aut plane sophistica videre licet apud Sextum 
Empiricum lib. I, cap. 19." See also the original manuscript in the Bodleian, Ms Savile 37f., 99v-l00, 
which contains a brief, erased sentence not included in the printed text. 
2> Ibid., 140. Savile also mentions a second problem, the theory of proportion, which was discussed 
by Leibniz. 
2. Leibniz to Varignon, Hanover, 2 February 1702, Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, ed. Carl 
Immanuel Gerhardt, 1st pt., Vol. 4 (Halle, 1859),94-95 (Gesammelte Werke, ed. Georg Heinrich Pertz, 
3rd Series); see also Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed" tr. and intr. 
Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht, 1969), 544. Leibniz was not alone in appreciating Sextus 
Empiricus. Walther von Tschirnhaus wrote to him that: ·Sexti Philosophi Pyrrhoniarum hypotheseon 
libri tres, Parisiis 1569 in folio, habe mitt delectation gelesen.· See Der Briefwechsel von Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz mit Mathematikem, ed. Carl Immanuel Gerhardt (Berlin, 1899), 1:397. 
27 Leibniz to EdmondeMariotte, mid-1676, G. W. Leibniz: Philosophischer Briejwechsel, vol. 1: 1663-
1685 (Darmstadt, 1926), 268-69. In the letter Leibniz presents geometry as the most fundamental of all 
mathematical branches. 
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As I have suggested, such a foundationalist interpretation of the Pyrrhonist 
challenge can be slightly incorrect. The main difficulty is that for Sextus Empiricus 
a non-empirical geometry was impossible. Insofar as Euclidean geometry provides 
information about physical space and the behavior of objects in it, it must be true 
of the world and rely on a physicalization of its primitive notions. One can then 
demonstrate that geometry provides no direct knowledge about the real nature of the 
world by determining what contradictions must necessarily arise from a physical 
interpretation of its elements. The process of de-physicalization thus amounts to a 
process of de-alethization of mathematics-mathematical statements in themselves 
are not necessarily true of the world. Many contemporary mathematicians and 
certainly Poincare would have found little to object to this position. But according 
to Sextus, a full de-alethization of geometry amounts to showing that no geometry 
is possible at all. There is no conceptual space between a de-alethizated geometry 
and a non-geometry at all because no distinction between syntactic consistency and 
semantic truth is clearly in view. This is why, contrary to Huefs or Hume's, 
Sextus' mathematical skepticism should be interpreted as a radical use of 
empiricism only, without further implications for the foundation of axiomatic 
geometry. For the Pyrrhonist, either mathematics counts as knowledge of the 
world, or it is nothing at all, but not the former, therefore the latter. No 
appreciation of a purely a priori, hypothetico-deductive approach is envisaged by 
Sextus. This appears very clearly in the first part of Contra Geometras, where the 
use of axioms is criticized because postulating does not amount to a justification of 
the hypotheses, i.e., cannot provide the hypothesis in question with a truth-content, 
whilst no notice is taken of the possibility of interpreting geometry as a purely 
consistent system ofhypothetico-deductive, ontologicallynon-informative statements. 
Once again, it is worth remarking that Leibniz, in his correspondence with Simon 
Foucher on mathematical skepticism, defended an interpretation of geometrical 
statements as only conditionally true?S 
THE HISTORIAN'S REPLY TO THE SKEPTIC 
Unlike Leibniz, Montucla maintains that the skeptical objections miss the point, yet 
he does not simply dismiss them as useless sophisms, like Savile. He attempts to 
show that geometry does have an empirical content, which explains its applicability 
and usefulness, but in a sense different from the one criticized by the skeptics. This 
leads him to endorse an ambiguous position half way between Euclidean "abstract-
ionism" and modem "structuralism." 
In order to overcome Sextus' extreme form of empiricism, Montucla defends the 
abstract nature of the most elementary of geometrical entities. Like Aristotle, he 
denies that points, lines, and surfaces are actual bodies.29 But when he comes to 
28 Hide Ishiguro "Les verites hypothetiques: Un examen de la lettre de Leibniz a Foucher de 1675," 
Leibniz a Paris (1672-1676), Vol. 2, Studia Leibnitiana, Supplementa, 18 (1978), 33-42. 
2. Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo II, 13, 296 a 17. 
Mathematical Skepticism 55 
specify more positively what such objects may be, Montucla hesitates between two 
alternatives. On the one hand, he insists on defending the classic abstractionist 
view: the elements are the result of an intellectual decomposition of physical bodies. 
A surface is the limit (terme) of a volume, a line is the limit of a surface, and a 
point is the limit of a line. This, however, implies only that geometrical elements 
still have an empirical value. It does not explain why we should not treat them as 
Sextus Empiricus does, that is, as conceivable objects, possessing only a carefully 
selected number of physical properties but still somewhat resembling empirical 
objects in some of their features. The fact that no perceived entities exactly 
correspond to the basic geometrical concepts has always been a problem for any 
empiricist philosophy of geometry, from Mill to Lotze and Wundt, a difficulty 
usually tackled by speaking of abstraction (Le., elimination) and idealization (Le., 
improvement) of certain properties starting from empirical perceptions. In 
Montucla's case, the attempted solution consists in introducing a functionalist 
interpretation: elementary objects in themselves are only divisors of more complex 
objects. Surfaces are what volumes can be divided into, lines are the divisors of 
surfaces, points of lines, and a point is the geometrical entity that has no divisor. 
Their hierarchy is established by the asymmetric nature of the relation of division 
implemented. Volumes, surfaces, and lines are not assemblages of more elementary 
components, for a limit-divisor of something is not part of that something.30 
Thanks to such a functionalist interpretation, Montucla can maintain that the first and 
the third arguments put forward by Sextus are misleading. In both cases, the lines 
in question are not constitutive elements of the surface, but terms of division (termes 
des divisions) of it, and no collection of lines-as-divisors will ever give rise to a 
surface. Likewise, two segments of different length can be said to contain the same 
number of points in the sense that they can be divided into an equal number of parts, 
but no conclusion can be drawn about their corresponding magnitude. In both cases, 
the problem is solved by eliminating one of its conditions of possibility. Note, 
however, that Sextus' second argument is not directly affected by the reply, and 
indeed Montucla simply leaves it unexplained. 
Montucla's functionalist interpretation of geometrical entities could lead him to 
endorse a purely structuralist view about the reality of geometrical constructs. A 
point or a line in a geometrical system would be like the bishop in a chess game: a 
set of axioms or rules establishes a finite number of relations among a limited 
number of arbitrarily chosen primitive terms that remain undefmed, thus determin-
ing, implicitly, what consistent functional properties the latter must satisfy. Hence 
the entities in themselves are not self-subsisting objects, but discrete hypostatizations 
of function-bearers, logical constants of the axiomatic system standing for abstract 
classes of properties-relations with no intrinsic ontological status over and above the 
role they play within the system. In this way, a set of axioms or rules can be said 
to provide the meanings of some basic terms only in the sense that it specifies how 
those terms have to be employed, not in the sense that it makes explicit what 
30 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 8, 215 b 19. 
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"things" they are or stand for. This is how we think mathematics works todayY 
And Montucla seems to go some way toward this view, for he maintains that: a) 
geometricians do not care whether or not the perfect objects (either elementary or 
complex constituents of a geometrical body) they speak about exist in reality; and 
b) geometrical statements are only hypothetically true, since they depend on non-
existing elementary objects: if one assumes that p then q must follow, yet there may 
be nothing exactly like p in reality. 
But all this must have appeared to him insufficient to explain the applicability of 
geometry to the physical world, for in order to counterbalance his anti-empiricism, 
endorsed as a defense against the Pyrrhonist attack, we have seen that Montucla re-
asserts his interpretation of perfect geometrical bodies as intellectual limits (limites 
intellectuelles) of material objects, idealizations which become increasingly useful 
the closer reality approximates them. Insofar as points, lines, and surfaces are 
abstracted and not just theoretical entities, they depend, for their existence, on the 
existence of such perfect bodies. Whether such idealizations can exist in reality will 
be a matter of physical discovery, according to Montucla. As long as the physical 
nature of space remains unknown, it is sufficient that the "metaphysical ideas" of 
such perfect bodies are clear and evident. This defense of geometrical abstraction-
ism allows Montucla to rely on the notion of truth to justify the value of mathemati-
cal knowledge and applied mathematics, and hence to disregard the purely internal 
feature of logical consistency. The crisis begun by non-Euclidean geometries is still 
far in the future, and there is no reason why a purely axiomatic approach should be 
appreciated or even employed to replace the intuitive correspondence between 
physical space and Euclidean geometry. The imagistic interpretation of clear and 
distinct ideas, rather than the algebraic construction of a consistent and economic 
system of axioms and theorems, can still lead geometrical research. 
THE MISSING FIGURE IN THE HISTORIAN'S CANVAS 
We have seen that there are a number of interesting issues Sextus never mentions 
in his objections, including the three Geometrical problems. There is a significant 
omission in Montucla that deserves equal attention. Although he refers to many 
people whom he himself recognizes as very little known, Montucla never mentions 
David Hume. Of course, there may be several explanations for this fact, ranging 
31 Roberto Torretti, Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincare, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht, 1984), 
141: " ... structure i.e., relation nets is all that geometers really care for. It is not the nature of points 
and lines (which nobody has ever been able to explain) but how they stand to one another in a system 
of relations of incidence and order which is the concern of projective geometry, and this is sufficiently 
known once we know the group which preserves this system. [The modern axiomatic method] is based 
on the assumption that the objects of a mathematical theory need not be ascribed more than what is 
strictly necessary for them to sustain the relations we require them to have to one another. The basic 
objects of such a theory are determined just by its basic propositions, the axioms, that layout the 
relational net into which those objects are inserted. Such a determination is as much as a mathematical 
theory requires. " 
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from the diffusion of Hume's writings in France32 to the kind of sources Montucla 
relied upon for his knowledge of mathematical skepticism (possibly Bayle's 
Dictionary, see Montucla's Histoire, 1:21, or Proclus33). From a purely theoretical 
perspective, however, there remains the fact that Hume's absence is perfectly 
explicable within the development of mathematical thought in the eighteenth century. 
I have remarked above that the modem history of mathematical theories appears 
to have followed two fundamental directions: a progressive mathematization of our 
knowledge of the natural world, and an equally impressive, if slightly later, de-
physicalization of mathematics, which led, between the end of the last and the 
beginning of our century, to the structuralist approach and a full axiomatization of 
the foundations of the discipline. Hume wrote at a moment when the mathematiza-
tion of physics was increasing dramatically but the de-physicalization of mathematics 
had not yet become a major trend. So his philosophy of mathematics went largely 
unnoticed. The odd fact is that by the time the de-physicalization of mathematics 
became a central issue, Hume's position had been forgotten, for Kant had become 
the central figure in the philosophy of mathematics. Between the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when Musil describes the 
young Torless's bewilderment about the nature of numbers-no longer geometrical 
entities, mind-he makes his professor of mathematics refer him to the Critique of 
Pure Reason, even though Kant had devoted much more attention to geometry than 
to arithmetic. Discussing the fortune of Euclidean geometry, Hans Reichenbach 
remarked once that: 
Unless one was a [Pyrrhonian] skeptic, one was content with the fact that certain 
assumptions had to be believed axiomatically [indeed, Sextus would say 
"dogmatically"]; analytical philosophy has learned through Kant's critical 
philosophy to discover genuine problems in questions previously utilized only by 
skeptics in order to deny the possibility of knowledge.34 
But it is only when a reaction against Kant takes place that neopositivists such as 
A.J. Ayer rediscover Hume as one of their main reference points, thus transfiguring 
what should probably count as a skeptical view of mathematical knowledge into one 
of the most common philosophies of mathematics of our time. Mathematics 
becomes a hypothetico-deductive study of logical structures, consisting of analytic 
statements, true a priori because ontologically content-empty. After the foundation-
alist crisis, mathematics shifts its balance from truth to coherence, thus losing its 
32 See the paper by Laurence L. Bongie "Hume and Skepticism in Late Eighteenth-Century France" in 
this volume. 
33 Procius, A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements, tr. with intr. and notes by Glenn R. 
Morrow (Princeton, NJ, 1970), 199: "Up to this point we have been dealing with the principles, and it 
is against them that most critics of geometry have raised objections, endeavoring to show that these parts 
are not firmly established. Of those in this group whose arguments have become notorious some, such 
as the Sceptics, would do away with all knowledge, like enemy troops destroying the crops of a foreign 
country, in this case a country that has produced philosophy .... ' 
34 Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, tr. Maria Reichenbach and John Freund, with 
intr. remarks by Rudolf Camap (New York, 1958). 
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strongest anti-skeptical peculiarity. 
AN END WITH A VIEW 
The interpretation of mathematical skepticism I have offered in the previous pages 
could be summarized in a fistful of famous quotations: for Plato "God eternally 
geometrizes," and at the end of the sixteenth century Kepler still agreed with that. 
Yet the algebraization of geometry made Kronecker believe that "God made the 
integers; all else is the work of man." The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries 
and the development of Cantor's treatment of infinite sets convinced Hilbert that 
"No one shall expel us from the paradise which Cantor created for us." God, and 
above all geometry, had been replaced by the human construction of set theory, but 
the former was going to reappear in the mathematical imagination. For after 
G6del's proof that consistency of number theory cannot be established by the narrow 
logic permissible in metamathematics, Weyl suggested that "God exists since 
mathematics is consistent, and the devil exists since we cannot prove its consisten-
cy." By the time geometry had been replaced by set theory and the de-physicaliza-
tion and the corresponding de-alethization of mathematics had been completed, 
Russell wrote that "mathematics is the subject in which we never know what we are 
talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true," while Einstein believed that 
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far 
as they are certain, they do not refer to reality." I suppose Sextus Empiricus would 
have found the escalation implicit in this series of remarks very reassuring. 
The history of reason is one of a constant striving of the mind for the achieve-
ment of intellectual freedom from reality. In the course of the history of thought, 
the distance between mind and being widens and, through such a constant process 
of detachment, reflection becomes epistemologically ever more responsible for its 
own constructs, while at the same time increasingly self-referential in its activities. 
From Proclus' invitation "to free geometry from Kalypso's embrace," to Cantor's 
suggestion that "Mathematics is entirely free in its development and its concepts are 
restricted only by the necessity of being noncontradictory and coordinated to 
concepts previously introduced by precise definitions .... The essence of mathemat-
ics lies in its freedom, "35 the history of mathematical theories appears to be 
perfectly coherent with the previous view, which I acknowledge to be unashamedly 
metaphysical. A progressive mathematization of our knowledge of the world in its 
most diverse aspects, from physical to social phenomena, and an equally impressive, 
if somewhat later, de-physicalization of mathematics, which led, between the end of 
the last and the beginning of our century, to a full axiomatization of the foundations 
of the discipline: these two movements are aspects of the same phenomenon. It was 
precisely the detachment of mathematics from its empirical models that made it 
possible to interpret and dominate more and more aspects of reality with the same 
35 Georg Cantor, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, ed. Ernst Zermelo (Berlin, 1932),182, quoted by Kline, 
Mathematical Thought. 
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mathematical theories. When Euclidean geometry disengaged itself from empirical 
interpretations via its arithmetization and then axiomatization, geometries only 
locally isomorphic to it became conceivable, geometries that could replace the fifth 
postulate with a different axiom and hence become capable of handling non-
Euclidean spaces. Only a purely algebraic approach allows us to provide rigorous 
definitions of Weierstrass' curve, which is nowhere differentiable, or of Peano's 
curve, which is capable of covering a whole surface. The same non-empirical 
approach to set theory makes it possible to understand how the part may not 
necessarily be smaller than the whole. Geometry has moved from the abstraction 
and idealization of selected properties of physical objects to the hypostatization of 
logical relations. The loss of intuitive certainty has been repaid by the acquisition 
of certain universality. As thought increasingly detached from what common sense 
offers up as apparently undisputable in ordinary experience, a kind of constructive 
skepticism has often been a fundamental driving force. Radical questioning is made 
possible by the capacity of the mind to conceive what is logically consistent but not 
actual, and the presentation of the conceivable is usually the best conceptual tool 
whereby thought can disengage itself from its momentary forms of more or less 
dogmatic realism, and hence move toward a better appreciation of its theoretical 
responsibilities. I hope my discussion of Montucla's anti-skeptical arguments has 
helped to provide such a view with sufficient cogency. 
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